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ABSTRACT
This chapter studies political dynamics at the micro-level of the European Commission and
poses the following question: Does the European Commission manage to transform the
loyalties and identities of Commission officials? Studying the mix of national and
supranational loyalties amongst Commission officials is important in order to assess the
political dynamics of the core executive of the European Union. Moreover, the parallel
administration of the European Commission is an important laboratory for studying the
political dynamics of system integration across the EU/nation-state interface. This study
applies an institutional middle-range approach to make conditional assessments on the
transformative power of the parallel administration of the European Commission. This
chapter challenges the idea that politics of system integration happen mostly at the
Commissioner level. I argue that political dynamics of system integration are strongly present
at the bureaucratic level of Commission DGs and units. This chapter suggests a middle-range
research agenda for future empirical studies of the political dynamics of system integration
and transformation in Europe.
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INTRODUCTION1
Despite much effort uncovering the cogs and wheels of European integration, the scholarly
debate has largely been trapped in a neo-functionalist versus intergovernmentalist dichotomy.
The 1990’s, however, witnessed a theoretical turn in the study of European integration
towards less focus on either/or ‘unifying story-lines’ and more in the direction of both/and
middle-range theories (Geyer 2003). This theoretical move partially reflects a more general
‘institutionalist turn’ in the study of public administration and European integration (Jupille
and Caporaso 1999; March and Olsen 1998). This chapter suggests an institutional middle-
range approach that makes conditional assessments of the transformative potential of the
parallel administration of the European Commission. The goal is to outline a research agenda
for future empirical studies of the political dynamics of system transformation in Europe.
This chapter challenges the political-technocratic dichotomy by studying political dynamics at
the micro-level of civil servants of the European Commission (Smith 2003: 150). This is,
however, not a reductionist move because I conceptualise the roles and identities evoked by
civil servants as institutionally constituted and constrained (March and Olsen 1989: 4). The
main argument of this chapter is that political institutions are transformational institutions,
and that transformational institutions are supranational institutions. To substantiate this claim,
the chapter poses the following question: Does the Commission manage to transform the
loyalties and identities of national civil servants seconded on short-term contracts to the
European Commission? Arguably, identity transformation among seconded Commission civil
servants serves as a yardstick of the political dynamics within the parallel administration of
the Commission. I basically argue that the ‘political’ aspect of the European Commission has
a primarily a non-territorial and supranational component. Hence, it is the supranational
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dynamics that ultimately distinguishes the European Commission as a political institution
(Trondal 2003).
Secondment refers to national civil servants hired on temporary contracts within the European
Commission. Studying the mix of national and supranational loyalties amongst Commission
officials is important in order to assess the transformative power of the European Commission
writ large. Supranational loyalties denote Commission officials identifying with the EU at
large, with the European Commission, with the Directorate General (DG) in which they are
employed, or with particular task roles. Hence, supranational loyalty means simply
identifying with EU institutions at different levels. Despite the existence of several partially
competing organisational logics within the Commission (Christiansen 1997), it is important to
uncover the relative primacy of supranational dynamics. This chapter highlights one under-
researched ‘Cinderella’ of the European Commission where territorial dynamics may have
ample chances of survival and viability: the parallel administration of seconded national civil
servants (Cini 1996; Shore 2000; Wessels 1985). Hence, a least likely research design
underpins the study.
One rationale for studying national civil servants seconded to the European Commission is to
assess the extent to which individual officials come to construct new additional supranational
loyalties, identities and role perceptions. By controlling for a self-selection dynamic, this
represents a critical examination of the socialising and re-socialising power of the European
Commission. Arguably, the emergence of supranational identities and roles amongst seconded
Commission officials is indicative of system transformation at the level of individual civil
servants. According to the White Paper on European Governance issued by the Commission
in 2001 “exchange of staff and joint training between administrations at various levels would
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contribute to a better knowledge of each other’s policy objectives, working methods and
instruments” (European Commission 2001: 13). According to Olsen (2003: 58), “the future
organization of Europe involves a strugle for people’s minds, their identities and normative
and causal beliefs”.
The European Commission is the core executive body at the heart of the EU (Nugent 1997)
and a catalyst of European integration and transformation of national government systems.
However, few studies have penetrated the internal life of the European Commission (e.g.
Cram 1994; Edwards and Spence 1997; Shore 2000; Smith 2003). Not surprisingly, the
parallel administration of the Commission has been subject to less scholarly attention. I argue,
however, that seconded Commission personnel represent an adequate testing-ground for
institutional approaches on the political dynamics of system transformation. Seconded
national civil servants are heavily “pre-packed” and pre-socialised prior to entering the
Commission. Their stay at the Commission is relatively short and the majority return to prior
positions in national ministries or agencies when their temporary contracts come to an end.
Hence, one should expect these officials to be fairly reluctant Europeans. However, the
prospective emergence of supranational allegiances amongst seconded personnel in the short,
medium or long term is indicative of the supranational character of the Commission.
Moreover, the enactment of supranational allegiances amongst seconded national civil
servants is indicative of the transformative power and thus the political dynamics of the
European Commission writ large.
The chapter is sequenced as follows: The next section provides a short review of the parallel
administration of the European Commission, succeeded by two concepts of system integration
across levels of governance: a weak and a strong. Finally, a middle-range institutionalist
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perspective to system integration is outlined that suggests conditions under which
supranational allegiances are likely to precede national and sectoral allegiances amongst
seconded civil servants. Suggestively, supranational allegiances are likely to be evoked under
the following conditions: (H1) if the officials have the European Commission as their primary
institutional affiliation; (H2) if the European Commission is organised according to principles
that challenge the governance dynamics of domestic government systems; (H3) if the
seconded personnel are employed in the European Commission for long periods of time and
participate intensively in the day-to-day decision-making processes of the Union; (H4) if the
seconded personnel are weakly pre-socialised before entering the Commission; and (H5) if
the seconded personnel are strongly integrated into the social life of the Commission. Based
on these conditional hypotheses this study outlines a middle-range research agenda for future
empirical analyses on the political dynamics of the European Commission.
THE PARALLEL ADMINISTRATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
There is a surprising dearth of in-depth empirical studies of the European Commission
(Christiansen 1997: 83; Egeberg 1996; Shore 2000: 127). Most studies of the Commission are
focused on the President, the Commissioners, the formal organisation, the permanent
bureaucratic staff and the historical evolution of the Commission. Thus, it should not surprise
that the parallel administration of the Commission is severely under-researched (Christiansen
1997: 84).
Organisations often consist of two parallel procedures for recruitment and two sets of
personnel: permanent and temporary officials recruited on the basis of merit and quotas, or
parachutage, respectively. The construction of new organisations often warrants hiring
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external officials on temporary basis. This was also the case when constructing the High
Authority in the 1950s. However, envisaging an independent European bureaucracy, Jean
Monnet rejected the model of delegated and temporary seconded national civil servants at the
centre of the Community executive (Shore 2000: 177). This vision of Jean Monnet largely
collided with the wishes of the French government in the 1950s and 1960s. The French
government “had made a strong case for the Commission to be comprised solely of temporary
officials seconded from national administrations” (Cini 1996: 120-121). For federalists, like
Monnet, secondments represented the opposite of an independent civil service at the EU level.
Accordingly, the parallel administration of the Commission represented, for federalists like
Monnet, a ‘Trojan Horse’ threatening the coherence and autonomy of the core executive body
of the emerging European Community.
However, recruitment to the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community and to the
Commission(s) of the EEC was mainly based on national officials on short-term contracts
(Nugent 2001). Today, few international organisations have institutionalised a parallel
administration to the same extent as the European Commission. Reflecting increased
workload, functional differentiation and a need for external assistance, the non-statuary staff
of the Commission has increased to about 30 per cent of the current Commission’s workforce
(European Commission 1999: 18). The Council of Ministers, the Council Secretary and the
European Parliament have “practically no temporary staff” (Bodiguel 1995: 451). However,
different EU institutions often second officials among themselves (Christiansen 2001). The
size of the current parallel administration of the European Commission has even forged
counter-reactions from the Commission, highlighting that “the high percentage of non-
permanent officials in the Commission cannot be justified” (European Commission 2000: 37).
The parallel administration of the Commission makes up a considerable part of the institution,
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making the Commission a multi-faceted organisation with respect to recruitment practises,
personnel, career paths, and, perhaps, institutional allegiances and individual loyalties.
Being largely an understaffed institution, the Commission is heavily dependent on external
assistance. This assistance is brought into the Commission through the web of EU committees
and more permanently through the non-statuary staff. However, whereas ‘comitology’ has
grown into a big “research industry”, secondments have been given only scarce scholarly
attention. At present, about 16 000 permanent officials work on established posts in the
Commission (Nugent 2001: 164; Stevens and Stevens 2001: 17). Additionally, the
Commission has about 4 200 non-permanent officials on various short-term contracts
(European Commission 1999: 9). This system of non-permanent staff is divided into three
different sub-groups: temporary agents (N = 2400), auxiliary staff (N = 1000), and seconded
national experts (N = 760) (European Commission 1999: 9; Stevens and Stevens 2001: 17).
This study focuses particularly on the latter, that is civil servants from member-state
administrations “loaned to the Commission for up to three years” (Spence 1997: 9).
Temporary agents and auxiliary staff, by contrast, come from various research institutes,
interest organisations, etc. Indicative of the increased salience of seconded personnel in the
Commission, these officials numbered 200 in 1989, 250 in 1990, about 600 in 1994, and in
1995 the number was 650 (Bodiguel 1995: 442; Edwards and Spence 1997: 79). At present,
seconded national officials number 760, accounting for 15 per cent of all A-grade staff of the
Commission and probably for about 25 per cent of A4 to A6 staff (Nugent 2001: 165; Stevens
and Stevens 2001: 20). Hence, the parallel administration of the Commission has increased
about 250 per cent in the 1990s, especially in the top ranks.2 Moreover, this part of the
Commission will be extended substantially with the EU enlargement in 2004. The
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Commission has estimated a need of over 5000 new recruits from the candidate countries,
mostly based on non-permanent posts (EUobserver 2003).
Seconded national experts have a potential for generating system integration across levels of
governance “by allowing [national] civil servants … to learn about [EU] procedures and
administrative culture” (Spence 1997: 79). According to the Commission (1999: 63),
seconded national experts “are a way of forging stronger links between national
administrations and the Commission…”. Moreover, studying the emergence of supranational
loyalties amongst temporary national experts within the Commission can identify mechanisms
of re-socialisation at the heart of the European Union. According to Shore (2000: 152),
“[t]hey find it a wonderfully mind-expanding experience: most who come here want to stay
after their secondment has finished. Like the agents temporaires, once they get one foot in the
door they want to get the rest of their body through”.
TWO CONCEPTS OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION
This section outlines a weak and a strong concept of system integration. A weak concept
views system integration as the web of contacts, networks and relationships that emerges
between politico-administrative systems. A strong concept measures system integration as
transformational change – that is, the basic dynamics of governance, decision-making, and
individual roles and identities change.
System integration, both in the weak and strong sense, is a relatively embryonic field of study,
remains under-studied and poorly understood. System integration or engrenage may be
understood as processes and not fixed states of affairs (Held 1999: 27). The mutual
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relationships between politico-administrative systems constitute ever-changing phenomena in
political-administrative life. Just like single organisations are in constant states of flux, the
relationships between organisations are constantly evolving. Moreover, system integration is
relational - covering the relationships, interdependencies and interconnections between
different systems and between the members of these systems (Spinelli 1966). Finally, system
integration is a continuum, not a dichotomy, ranging from weak to strong modes of
integration (Trondal 1999). As discussed more thoroughly below, weak system integration
requires that actual contacts occur between at least two systems. A stronger notion of
integration requires, in addition, that these contacts mutually affect the systems and the
individual members within them.
Several suggestions as to how to conceptualise system integration have been addressed in the
literature. Rosenau (1969: 46) defines system integration as penetrative processes whereby
“members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another”. March
(1999: 134) conceives of system integration as gauged at measuring the “density, intensity
and character of the relations amongst the elements of [different systems]”. Moreover,
‘”integration” signifies some measure of the density, intensity and character of the relations
among the constitutive elements of a system’ (Olsen 2001: 4). Referring to system integration
in the EU, Scheinman (1966: 751) sees system integration as the “intermingling of national
and international bureaucrats in various working groups and committees in the policy-making
context of the EEC”. Similarly, Majone (1996) “refers to the idea of copinage technocratique
to denote the interaction between Brussels officials, experts from industry, and national civil
servants” (quoted from Radaelli 1999: 759 – original emphasis). Common to all these
conceptualisations is an emphasis on the mutual relationships and contacts between systems
and the members of these systems. In that sense, these conceptions of system integration
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represent fairly weak definitions of this phenomenon, emphasising that different systems
actually come into mutual contact of some sort.
Approaching a stronger notion of system integration, Barnett (1993: 276) asks, “[w]hat
happens when state actors are embedded in two different institutions … that call for different
roles and behaviour?” Similarly, Olsen (1998: 2) asks, “[w]hat happens to organised political
units when they become part of a larger unit?” More assertive, Eriksen and Fossum (2000: 16)
argue that “integration, in the true meaning of the term, depends on the alteration, not the
aggregation of, preferences”. System integration thus denotes processes whereby
organisational dynamics and behavioural logics are transformed amongst European
institutions and decision-makers (Held 1999: 18). This represents a stronger definition of
system integration by emphasising how governance systems are mutually affected due to
increased and intensive interaction.
From the late 1960s onwards, a growing literature on system integration emerged in the wake
of accelerating processes of European integration. Studies of public administrations
discovered how domestic administrative systems became increasingly embedded within
international political orders. Consequently, the open-ended and multilevel character of
domestic politico-administrative systems attracted increased attention from scholars of public
administration. Early scholarly contributions to system integration demonstrated how the
domestic-international distinction became increasingly blurred due to the intermingling of
national and international bureaucrats (Cassese 1987; Egeberg 1980; Feld and Wildgen 1975;
Hopkins 1976; Kerr 1973; Pendergast 1976; Scheinman 1966: 751; Scheinman and Feld
1972). Highlighting ‘bureaucratic inter-penetration’ across levels of governance, this literature
emphasised that the description of the Community as ‘above’, ‘alongside’ or ‘outside’ the
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member states were oversimplifications (Rosenau 1969; Scheinman 1966). The national level
and the Community level were described as mutually interwoven and intermixed in
fundamental ways (Demmke 1998: 15). This body of literature highlighted that national
government officials became regular participants at the EU level of governance (Rosenau
1969). However, only scarce attention was devoted to how such cross-level participation
affected the ‘inner selves’ of the participants, let alone their actual decision-making behaviour
(see however Feld and Wildgen 1975; Kerr 1973; Pendergast 1976; Scheinman and Feld
1972). As such, a weak notion of system integration underpinned these early studies. This
chapter advocates a stronger definition by focusing on the political/transformative dynamics
of system integration.
Going beyond a sui generis notion of the European Commission, the next section suggests a
middle-range institutionalist approach to system integration. First, assuming that the
Commission shares important characteristics with national bureaucracies, three general
institutionalist arguments are outlined to render intelligible system integration through the
parallel administration of the European Commission. Second, I propose five hypotheses that
specify five institutional conditions under which seconded Commission officials are likely to
evoke supranational allegiances.
TOWARDS A MIDDLE-RANGE ACCOUNT ON SYSTEM INTEGRATION
Departing from three general institutionalist perspectives suggested below (STEP I), I suggest
a middle-range institutionalist account on system integration (STEP II). STEP II identifies
conditions that are conducive to the emergence of supranational roles and allegiances among
seconded Commission officials. Through this endeavour STEP II also specifies conditions
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under which pre-established national and sectoral identities and roles are sustained among
these officials. Our aim is not foremost to theorise the various micro-foundations that
underpin the three institutionalist approaches, only to suggest conditions under which
seconded Commission personnel evoke supranational roles and identities. STEP II thus aims
at making conditional assessments of the political dynamics of the parallel administration of
the Commission services.
STEP I: Three institutionalist arguments
STEP I introduces institutional arguments from Simon (1957), Selznick (1957) and March
and Olsen (1989) which emphasise the transformative potential of organisational structures.
The first perspective is a cognitive perspective on organisations (Simon 1957). According to
the bounded rational approach in organisational science the attention of actors is limited.
Humans have cognitive limitations, rendering them vulnerable to the systematic selection of
decision premises and stimuli offered by organisational structures. Moreover, assuming that
actors are multiple selves, organisational arrangements contribute to activate and deactivate
particular repertoires of decision behaviour, identities and role perceptions. Political and
administrative life is pictured as multi-faceted, contextualised and endogenous. More
particularly, formal structures are pictured as political agendas that contribute to a
mobilisation of bias (Hammond 1986; Schattschneider 1960). The identities enacted by
organisational actors reflect their rational choices, however, biased and skewed in systematic
ways by the organisational structures embedding them.
Formal organisations are sometimes “infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements
of the task at hand” (Selznick 1957: 17 – original emphasis). Value-laden organisations
acquire strong potentials for socialising the organisational members into loyal trustees. At the
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same time, however, actors affiliated to organisations with a strong institutional core are often
disposed to resist changing pre-established identities and roles (Knill 2001). Accordingly,
processes of socialisation over time make actors take particular identities and roles for
granted. Actors become norm- and rule-driven as a result of the internalisation of roles and
identities. A cultural perspective on organisations emphasises the “pre-packed” character of
governmental actors. When seconded into the European Commission national civil servants
will thus retain and sustain pre-established national and sectoral affiliations and evoke role
perceptions that deviate only marginally from past roles. Processes of re-socialisation into
supranational loyalties are subject to the logic of recency (March 1994: 70).
A related institutional perspective views actors’ identities and allegiances as reflecting logics
of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989). Actors often have several institutional affiliations
simultaneously that provide different cues for action and senses of belonging. Based on the
following questions actors make deliberate choices as to what identity and role to apply in
particular situations: (i) Who am I?; (ii) What kind of situation is this?; and (iii) What should
a person such as I do in a situation such as this (March and Olsen 1989: 23)? According to the
logic of appropriateness actors are basically rule- and identity-driven, however, not in the
sense of taken-for-grantedness (cf. above). Actors are consciously geared towards evoking
identities that associate with particular situations and that have several points of resemblance.
According to a logic of novelty, actors tend to evoke new identities and roles that deviate only
marginally from past identities and roles (March and Olsen 1989: 34).
*       *       *
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We have now addressed three supplementary institutional arguments. First, a bounded rational
argument emphasising that organisations have a transformative potential with respect to the
identities and allegiances evoked by the organisational members. According to this
perspective, organisational structure bias and skew role and identity perceptions in systematic
ways. However, the impact of socialisation processes is modest both with respect to depth and
permanence. Actors’ roles and identities are pictured as contingent and endogenous, but at the
same time malleable and not very deep-seated. The second and third institutionalist
approaches picture a stronger transformative potential of institutionalised organisations.
Officials not only ‘go native’ in Brussels, they tend to ‘stay native’ in the sense that new
supranational loyalties are internalised and/or considered appropriate. However, this
transformation and re-socialisation process easily becomes subject to inertia, path-
dependencies and a logic of recency (March 1994).
Bearing these different institutionalist insights in mind, the next section suggests an
institutionalist middle-range research agenda that specifies the conditions under which
seconded Commission staff is likely to evoke or construct supranational allegiances.
STEP II: Towards a middle-range approach
Despite arguing that the European Commission socialise Commission officials into
supranational agents and ‘European elites’ (Christiansen 2001; Shore 2000), less effort has
been put on studying under what conditions Commission officials evoke supranational
loyalties. Based on the above institutionalist arguments, this section suggests five conditions
to account for the political dynamics of system integration in general, and the emergence of
supranational allegiances in particular. These conditions are:
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· The primary and secondary institutional affiliations embedding seconded officials,
· The organisational dynamics underpinning these affiliations,
· The length and intensity of affiliation towards secondary institutions,
· The degrees and patterns of pre-socialisation within primary institutions, and
· The social milieu embedding civil servants.
Suggestively, supranational identifications are likely to be strengthened and fostered amongst
seconded Commission personnel under the following conditions. That is,
H1: if the officials have the European Commission as their primary institutional affiliation,
H2: if the European Commission is governed by dynamics that challenge the core dynamics
of national government systems,
H3: if the seconded personnel are employed in the European Commission for long periods of
time and participate intensively in the day-to-day decision-making processes of the Union,
H4: if the seconded personnel are weakly pre-socialised before entering the Commission, and
H5: if the seconded personnel are strongly integrated into the social milieu of the
Commission.
This section elaborates theoretically and substantiates empirically these five hypotheses. Due
to the present lack of systematic empirical studies of seconded personnel in the European
Commission, the discussion benefits from secondary empirical material on seconded officials
from different EU member-states and Norway (CLENAD 2003; EFTA Secretariat 2000;
Smith 1973; Smith 2001; Statskontoret 2001:17). In the following we analyse this body of
empirical material to help illustrate the above hypotheses.
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Upon arrival in the Commission, seconded national officials are supposed to work for the
Commission (EEA 2002: 6). However, despite being under Commission instructions (Staff
Regulations Art. 37), seconded civil servants retain their primary institutional affiliations to
their national ministries and agencies (EEA 2002) (H1). When seconded to the Commission
these civil servants remain largely paid by their national employer. Moreover, their stay in
Brussels is only temporary. When the secondment period reaches the end most civil servants
return to prior positions within the national civil service (CLENAD 2003: 6). Seconded
officials are thus heavily “pre-packed” and pre-socialised when entering the Commission
(H4). They also anticipate potential future career paths within the national civil service after
their stay in Brussels. Consequently, the Commission should be considered a secondary
institutional affiliation to the seconded personnel. Even when staying in the Commission,
their national ministry or agency remains their primary institutional affiliation. Accordingly,
the identities and roles evoked by seconded personnel are likely to be more national than
supranational. They are likely to attach weight to their national identities and roles while
working as non-statuary staff in the Commission. An early study of 36 former seconded
Dutch officials to the Commission reveals that all of them retained a national loyalty when
working in the Commission and “none indicated that [they] had ever come into conflict of
loyalty” (Smith 1973: 565). A study of seconded officials from the Scottish Office of the UK
central administration to the European Commission supports these arguments (Smith 2001).
Smith (2001) observes that seconded officials reinforce their national administrative cultures
and allegiances rather than becoming more supranationally oriented during their stay at the
Commission.
I argue that the internal organisational structures of the European Commission are conducive
to weakening national allegiances amongst seconded personnel (H2). The dominating
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organising principle of the Commission is sector (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). This
organising principle challenges the dominating territorial principle in international relations
and inter-state politics. The sectoral organisation of the Commission is especially strong at the
DG and the unit levels. Most seconded personnel are employed at the A1 and A2 levels
within the DGs. Reflecting the general low level of inter-DG co-ordination and mobility,
seconded personnel mostly work within singular DGs during their short Commission careers
(Edwards and Spence 1997; European Commission 1999: 57-58). According to a survey
conducted by the EFTA Secretariat (2000:1) among 18 Norwegian national experts to the
Commission, “all but one had been working in the same unit during their contract period”.
Hence, seconded personnel are affiliated to organisational units within the Commission that
are organised according to a sectoral principle. Prolonged and intensive exposure towards
sectoralised decision-making premises within the Commission DGs increases the likelihood
that the role and identity perceptions of the seconded personnel become denationalised and
strongly sectoralised (H2 and H3).
Egeberg (1996), McDonald (1997), and Shore (2000) support these propositions empirically.
Egeberg (1996) shows that permanent Commission officials put only marginal emphasis on
national allegiances (H1). Moreover, Cini (1997: 86) observes that institutional identities
among the statuary staff of former DG Competition and Environment are directed more
towards the DG level than towards the Commission at large (H2). Hence, the horizontal
organisation of the Commission affects the identities of the incumbents. Moreover, officials
employed in top rank positions within DGs having broad horizontal mandates and portfolios
are likely to identify with the Commission as a whole more strongly than officials employed
in medium or lower rank positions within DGs having specialist tasks descriptions. Overall,
sectoral allegiances are likely to precede national identifications amongst permanent
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Commission officials. However, Egeberg (1996) also reveals that the nationality of permanent
Commission officials affects their decision-making behaviour. This stems partly from the
territorial principles of organisation underpinning the Commission machinery (the cabinets,
national quotas, etc.) and partly from their national institutional affiliations. Accordingly,
seconded personnel to the Commission are likely to put particular emphasis on pre-established
national and sectoral roles due to their primary domestic affiliations and their sectoral
affiliations within the Commission DGs (H1 and H2).
Most seconded personnel have lifelong careers in the national civil services. Hence, they are
heavily pre-socialised before entering the Commission (H4). They remain mostly paid by
their national employer while working for the Commission. Most of them also return to prior
positions in the national civil service after finishing their stay in Brussels. Furthermore, the
European Commission is a relatively young and small institution compared to national central
administrations. These factors render it difficult for the Commission to instil new identities
and roles into officials with pre-established loyalties. Hence, supranational allegiances are
likely to be modified and conditioned by pre-existing national and sectoral allegiances
(Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Hooghe 2001; Kerr 1973; Scully 2002). Supporting these
arguments, national officials attending EU committees tend to evoke national roles more
strongly than supranational roles (Egeberg 1999; Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003;
Trondal 2001; Trondal and Veggeland 2003). This is due to the fact that the national
government machinery represents their primary institutional affiliation. However, it also
reflects the fact that only a segment of the EU committee participants attend the EU
committees with a high degree of energy and intensity (Trondal 2001).
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Most of the officials seconded to the Commission are national experts from sector ministries
or agencies organised beneath the ministry level (EFTA Secretariat 2000). These officials
have permanent positions within national government institutions that mostly are organised
according to sectoral and functional principles. Most seconded Commission personnel are
therefore accustomed to the organising principles of the Commission apparatus. Accordingly,
these officials are likely to put particular weight on sectoral identities, considerations and
interests. Together, the above arguments suggest that officials seconded to the European
Commission are likely to enact a mix of national and sectoral allegiances.
However, Shore (2000: 131) observes that an esprit de corps and a ‘community method’
emerge among new recruits to the permanent staff of the Commission. Similarly, some
national officials who attend EU committees tend to evoke supranational loyalties – especially
among those who are based at the Permanent Representations in Brussels (Lewis 2000;
Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003). Similar observations are likely in the case of seconded
Commission personnel, because these officials are affiliated to the Commission for longer
periods of time than the EU committee participants. Seconded personnel are also likely to be
involved in the social milieu within the Commission services more extensively than the EU
committee participants. Moreover, studies indicate that seconded officials retain fairly weak
formal and informal ties to their national employer while serving in the Commission
(CLENAD 2003: 12 and 21; Statskontoret 2001:17: 34). According to CLENAD (2003: 21),
57 % of the 230 seconded officials studied report that they receive insufficient communication
from the home organisation/employer on relevant home issues and developments. Together,
these factors render it likely that seconded Commission personnel evoke supranational
identifications more strongly than national officials who participate in EU committees.
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Re-socialisation in the EU is likely to happen mostly among those with long-term careers
attached to the EU institutions (although see Franklin and Scarrows 1999). This is the case
more at the bureaucratic level among Commission civil servants than among the
Commissioners (Lewis 2000; Smith 2003: 142). Seconded officials on long-term contracts are
likely to become re-socialised into supranational actors more strongly than officials on short-
term contracts. Acknowledging this, the Commission argues that secondment contracts “can
be so short that they sometimes make it difficult to incorporate the expert effectively into a
department or for them to adapt to the working environment in the Commission” (European
Commission 1999: 63). Seconded personnel are also de-coupled in time and space from
domestic institutions and decision-processes, providing circumstances under which additional
roles and identities are more easily evoked (Egeberg 1999: 461). In the EFTA survey the
potential conflict between national and supranational loyalties was acknowledged (EFTA
Secretariat 2000: 4). This conflict was reinforced by the fact that seconded officials had little
contact with their domestic constituencies.
The potential for being affected by institutional dynamics relates to the duration and intensity
of exposure towards certain organisational structures (Checkel 2001a; Risse and Sikkink
1999). The potential for being socialised and re-socialised increases with protracted
memberships within organisations (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Checkel 2001b: 26). This
general argument rests on socialisation theory that emphasises a positive relationship between
the intensity of participation within a collective group and the extent to which members of
this group take the world for granted (Meyer and Rowan 1991), become victims of ‘group
think’ (Janis 1982), or develop particular ‘community methods’ (Lewis 2000). Socialisation is
seen as a dynamic process whereby actors come to internalise the norms, rules and interests of
their government institution and task roles. Socialisation processes are uni-directional in the
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sense that the ‘socialisator’ educates, indoctrinates, teaches or diffuses his norms and ideas to
the ‘socialisee’. The potential for socialisation to occur is assumed positively related to the
duration and the intensity of interaction amongst the organisational members (Berger and
Luckmann 1966: 150; Kerr 1973; Pendergast 1976).
According to Ernst Haas (1958), participants become ‘locked in’ and socialised by the sheer
intensity of interaction. Similarly, present neo-functionalist scholarship assumes that the
emergence of supranational allegiances is “a function of the duration of the socialisation
impact” (Niemann 1998: 437 - emphasis added). “[T]he relative intensity of transnational
activity … broadly determines variations [in supra-nationalism]” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz
1998: 4). According to Deutsch, “common identities are the product of intensive transactions
and communications” (quoted in Rosamond 2000: 46). Accordingly, national civil servants on
secondment in the European Commission are likely to identify with EU institutions due to
“daily reinforcement” and intensive exposure towards information, stimuli and decision
premises at the EU level.
Most Commission officials have long working days. According to the EFTA Secretariat study
(2000:1-3), “[a]ll 18 EFTA secondments confirmed that they were involved in the work of
their respective unit in the same manner as their colleagues from the Member States”. They
interacted often with officials from other nationalities, experienced “cultural differences with
regard to working habits” and applied ‘Euro-speak’ (EFTA Secretariat 2000). According to
Shore (2000) ‘Euro-jargon’ and ‘Commission-speak’ characterise the working language used
by most Commission officials. Over time, seconded officials are likely to adapt to the same
set of grammar and semantics as permanent Commission officials. ‘Euro-language’ may
represent an identity-mark that establishes buffers towards the ‘others’ and underscores shared
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practises among themselves (Bellier 1997: 95). A shared vocabulary contributes to bind actors
together and assist in the construction of a distinct European elite (Christiansen, Jørgensen
and Wiener 2001: 15).
As a consequence of interacting frequently with fellow colleagues within the European
Commission seconded civil servants are likely to take on supranational identifications (H3)
(Christiansen 2001). However, some seconded officials also have prior experiences from
international organisations, trans-governmental committees and boards, and from the
permanent representations in Brussels. Moreover, some seconded officials are pre-socialised
through their educational background (e.g. the College of Europe, Brugge), or through a
multi-national family background. Suggestively, prior international experiences are conducive
to supra-nationalism (H4). Moreover, seconded personnel may have constructed supranational
loyalties prior to entering the European Commission. According to Page (1997: 60), seconded
officials generally have contacts with the Commission prior to entering it. Frequently, they
“indicate a wish to spend three years in Brussels” (Page 1997: 60). This indicates that
supranational identities may reflect processes of pre-socialisation as much as processes of re-
socialisation (cf. the self-selection argument (Kerr 1973:76-77)). However, studies of EU
committees indicate that supranational allegiances reflect processes of re-socialisation more
than processes of pre-socialisation (Trondal 2002). Yet, such conclusions are plagued with
methodological difficulties of causation. Further empirical studies are warranted to “verify”
the different pathways to supranationalism among permanent and temporary EU decision-
makers.
Finally, supranational allegiances may reflect the social milieu embedding seconded
personnel while staying in Brussels (H5). The physical symbols and artefacts dominating the
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Commission buildings remind the seconded staff about their current supranational
embeddedness. The blue flag with the golden stars in the reception area, in the corridors of the
Commission buildings and in the meeting rooms constantly remind the officials of their
current ‘European’ affiliation. Seconded personnel live in exile in Brussels, talk several non-
native languages, often applying ‘Euro-talk’ or ‘Commission speak’, socialise with other
nationalities, and live in ‘EU-ghettos’ in Brussels. Commission bureaucrats and the Belgian
population of Brussels “constitute two parallel social universes” (Abèlès, Bellier and
McDonald 1993: 26). Hence, the social environments surrounding seconded officials may be
conducive to the evocation of supranational identities. However, many Commission officials
also socialise with colleagues of the same nationality and take weekends off in their home
country (Stevens and Stevens 2001: 132). Hence, they are reminded of their national origins
on a daily or weekly basis. However, a high level of cross-border mobility may also be
conducive to the construction of supranational identities and roles. Hence, a blend of national
and supranational identities and roles is likely to be evoked by seconded Commission
personnel.
CONCLUSION
Few studies have empirically penetrated the inner life of the European Commission. The
dynamics that govern this supranational executive have attracted minor scholarly attention.
The current study had a dual goal: First, to identify the political nature of the European
Commission at the bureaucratic level of DGs and units. We asked, under what conditions are
Commission officials likely to construct or activate supranational roles, identities and
loyalties? Second, determining the political nature of the European Commission is warranted
when studying system integration across levels of governance. Arguably, studying the
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political dynamics of the parallel administration of the Commission is important for
understanding system integration in Europe.
Going beyond a sui generis view of the Commission, the current study applies institutional
arguments to account for the transformative power of the European Commission. According
to the institutional approaches outlined above organisational members often have multiple
institutional affiliations that generate multiple cues for action and role enactment. Seconded
personnel to the European Commission have two major institutional affiliations: the national
central administrative system and the European Commission. The former is considered
primary to these officials, even after being hired on fixed-term contracts within the
Commission (H1). The Commission DGs are deemed secondary to most seconded personnel,
however, more among newcomers than among senior secondments. Hence, national and
sectoral allegiances are likely to exceed supranational allegiances amongst the vast majority
of seconded personnel.
However, under certain conditions seconded personnel are likely to evoke supranational
allegiances more vigorously. That is the case among officials employed within national
ministries and agencies which are organised according to a sectoral principle (H2), officials
on long term contracts with the Commission (H3), officials who have prior socialisation
experiences from international organisations and universities (H4), who interact intensively
with officials from several other nationalities, who apply ‘Commission-speak’, and who live
in typical ‘EU-ghettos’ in Brussels (H5).
The hypotheses advocated in this chapter are not exhaustive, only suggestive. Making explicit
references to operational dimensions are vital in order to determine the conditions under
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which institutions matter generally, and in order to identify the conditions under which the
political dynamics of the European Commission contribute to system integration and
transformation in particular. Further empirical studies, however, are needed to test the
conditional validity of the hypotheses suggested here.
 NOTES
                                                
1 The financial support of the ARENA programme (The Norwegian Research Council), Agder
University College and “Sørlandets kompetansefond” is gratefully acknowledged. Earlier
versions of this chapter have been presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in
Grenoble 2001, at a publishing seminar at ARENA in 2001 and at the Biennial EUSA
conference in Nashville 2003. Thanks to the participants who attended these seminars. Special
thanks go to Jeffrey T. Checkel, Thomas Christiansen, Michelle Cini, Helen Drake, Tore
Grønningsæter, Virginie Guiraudon, Johan P. Olsen, Cècile Robert, Helene Sjursen, Andy
Smith and Ulf Sverdrup.
2 Seconded personnel are also parachuted into top positions of the Commission (A1 and A2
positions). Reflecting both individual aspirations, a need for technical expertise from outside
the Commission, informal national quota systems, as well as new states joining the EU,
“nearly half of senior appointments [in the Commission] are recruited through parachutage”
(Hooghe 1999: 399 – original emphasis). Even more, the vast majority of those parachuted to
the Commission are national civil servants (Page 1997: 85).
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 29
                                                                                                                                                        
REFERENCES
Abèlès, M., I. Bellier and M. McDonald (1993), ‘Approche Anthropologique de la
Commission Europèenne’, unpublished report to the European Commisison. Brussels.
Barnett, M. (1993), Institutions, Rules, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System’,
International Studies Quarterly, 37: 271-296.
Bellier, I. (1997), ‘The Commission as an Actor: An Anthropologist’s View’, in H. Wallace
and A. Young (eds.) Participation and Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford,
Clarendon Press.
Berger, P.L. and T. Luckmann (1966), The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the
Sociology of Knowledge, New York: Penguin Books.
Bodiguel, J.-L. (1995), ‘The civil service of the European Union’, International Review of
Administrative Sciences, 61: 433-453.
Cassese, S. (1987), ‘Divided powers: European administration and national bureaucracies’, in
S. Cassese (ed.) The European Administration, Brussels and Maastricht, IIAS and EIPA.
Checkel, J.T. (2001a), ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’,
International Organization, 55 (3): 553-588.
Checkel, J.T. (2001b), ‘Constructing European Institutions’, in G. Schneider and M.
Aspinwall (eds.) The rules of integration. Institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe,
Manchester, Manchester University Press.
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 30
                                                                                                                                                        
Christiansen, T. (1997), ‘Tensions of European governance: politicized bureaucracy and
multiple accountability in the European Commission’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4
(1): 73-90.
Christiansen, T. (2001), ‘The Commission – Council Secretariat “Complex”: Towards
Coherent Governance in the EU’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops,
Grenoble, 2001.
Christiansen, T., K.E. Jørgensen and A. Wiener (eds.) (2001), The Social Construction of
Europe, London: SAGE.
Cini, M. (1996), The European Commission. Leadership, organisation and culture in the EU
administration, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Cini, M. (1997), ‘Administrative Culture in the European Commission: The Cases of
Competition and Environment’, in N. Nugent (ed.) At the Heart of the Union. Studies of the
European Commission, Houndmills, Macmillan Press.
CLENAD (2003), Report of the Working Group ‘Life after SNE’, Brussels.
Cram, L. (1997), Policy-Making in the European Union: Conceptual Lenses and the
Integration Process, London: Routledge.
Demmke, C. (1998), ‘The Secret Life of Comitology or the Role of Public Officials in EC
Environment Policy’, EIPASCOPE, 3.
EEA (2002), Guidelines for Secondment of EEA EFTA National Experts to the European
Commission, Standing Committee of the EFTA States, 4/00/W/031, 1 Annex, Brussels.
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 31
                                                                                                                                                        
EFTA Secretariat (2000), Evaluation of arrangements with secondments, 4/FE/W/008, 2
Annexes, Brussels.
Edwards, G. and D. Spence (eds.) (1997), The European Commission, Harlow: Longman.
Egeberg, M. (1980), ‘The Fourth Level of Government: on the Standardization of Public
Policy within International Regions’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 3 (3): 235-248.
Egeberg, M. (1996), ‘Organization and Nationality in the European Commission services’,
Public Administration, 74 (4): 721-735.
Egeberg, M. (1999b), ‘Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of
National Officials in EU decision-making, Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (3): 456-474.
Egeberg, M., G.F. Schaefer, and J. Trondal (2003), ‘The Many Faces of EU Committee
Governance’, ARENA working paper 2, CES working paper 4.
Egeberg, M. and J. Trondal (1999), ‘Differentiated integration in Europe: the case of the EEA
country Norway’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (1): 133-142.
Eriksen, E.O. and J.E. Fossum (eds.) (2000), Democracy in the European Union. Integration
through Deliberation? London: Routledge.
EUobserver (2003), ‘Commission starts recruitment search in accession countries’,
http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=9438
European Commission (1999), Designing Tommorow’s Commission. A review of the
Commission’s Organisation and Operation. Brussels.
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 32
                                                                                                                                                        
European Commission (2000), Reforming the Commission. White Paper – Part II. Action
Plan. Com (2000) 200 final. Brussels
European Commission (2001), European Governance. White Paper. Com (2001) 428 final.
Brussels.
European Commission (2003), Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Community,
Brussels.
Feld, W.J. and J.K. Wildgen (1975), ‘National Administrative Elites and European
Integration. Saboteurs at Work?’, Journal of Common Marked Studies, XIII: 244-265.
Franklin, M.N. and S.E. Scarrow (1999), ‘Making Europeans? The Socializing Power of the
European Parliament’, in R.S. Katz and B. Wessels (eds.) The European Parliament, the
National Parliaments, and European Integration, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Geyer, R. (2003), ‘European Integration, the Problem of Complexity and the Revision of
Theory’, Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (1): 15-35.
Haas, E. (1958), The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hammond, T.H. (1986), ‘Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic
Politics’, American Journal of Political Science, 30 (1): 379-420.
Held, D. et al. (1999), Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Hooghe, L. (1999), ‘Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the
Orientations of Senior Commission Officials Towards European Integration’, Comparative
Political Studies, 32 (4): 435-453.
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 33
                                                                                                                                                        
Hooghe, L. (2001), The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. Images of
Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hopkins, R.F. (1976), ’The international role of “domestic” bureaucracy’, International
Organzation, 30 (3): 405-432.
Janis, I.L. (1982), Groupthink. Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Jupille, J. and J.A. Caporaso (1999), ‘Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond
International Relations and Comparative Politics, Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1):
429-444.
Kerr, H.H. Jr. (1973), ‘Changing Attitudes through International Participation: European
Parlamentarians and Integration’, International Organization, 27 (1): 45-83.
Knill, C. (2001), The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional
Change and Persistence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, J. (2000), ‘The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative
Rivalry in the Council’s intrastructure’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7 (2): 261-289.
McDonald, M. (1997), ‘Identities in the European Commission’, in N. Nugent (ed.) At the
Heart of the Union. Studies of the European Commission, Houndmills, Macmillan Press.
Majone, G. (1996), Regulating Europe, London: Routledge.
March, J.G. (1994), A Primer on Decision Making. How Decisions Happen, New York: The
Free Press.
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 34
                                                                                                                                                        
March, J.G. (1999), ‘A Learning Perspective on the Network Dynamics of Institutional
Integration’, in M. Egeberg and P. Lægreid (eds.) Organizing Political Institutions. Essays for
Johan P. Olsen, Oslo, Scandinavian University Press.
March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1989), Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of
Politics, New York: The Free Press.
March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1998), ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
Orders’, International Organization, 52 (4): 943-969.
Meyer, J.W. and B. Rowan (1991), ‘Institutionalised Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth
and Ceremony’, in W.W. Powell and P.J. DiMaggio (eds.) The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Niemann, A. (1998), ‘The PHARE programme and the concept of spillover: neofunctionalism
in the making’, Journal of European Public Policy, 5 (3): 428-446.
Nugent, N. (ed.) (1997), At the Heart of the Union. Studies of the European Commission,
Houndmills: Macmillan Press.
Nugent, N. (2001), The European Commission, Houndmills: Palgrave.
Olsen, J.P. (1998), ‘The New European Experiment in Political Organization’, paper
presented at the conference “Samples of the Future”, SCANCOR, Stanford University,
September, 1998.
Olsen, J.P. (2001), ‘Organising European Institutions of Governance. A Prelude to an
Institutional Account of Political Integration’, in H. Wallace (ed.) Interlocking Dimensions of
European Integration. London: Palgrave.
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 35
                                                                                                                                                        
Olsen, J.P. (2003), ‘Reforming European Institutions of Governance’, in J.H.H. Weiler, I.
Begg and J. Peterson (eds.) Integration in an Expanding European Union. Reassessing the
Fundamentals. Oxford: Blackwell.
Page, E.C. (1997), People Who Run Europe, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pendergast, W.R. (1976), ‘Roles and attitudes of French and Italian delegates to the European
Community’, International Organization, 30 (4): 669-677.
Radaelli, C.M. (1999), ‘The public policy of the European Union: Whither politics of
Expertise?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (5): 757-774.
Risse, T. And K. Sikkink (1999), ‘The Power of Principles: The Socialization of Human
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices’, in T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds.) The Power
of Principles: International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Rosamond, B. (2000), Theories of European Integration, Houndmills: Macmillan Press.
Rosenau, J.N. (1969), ‘Towards the Study of National-International Linkages’, in Rosenau
(ed.) Linkage Politics. Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems,
New York, The Free Press.
Schattschneider, E.E. (1960), The Semi-Sovereign People, New York: Holt, Rinehard &
Winston.
Scheinman, L. (1966), ‘Some Preliminary Notes on Bureaucratic Relationships in the
European Economic Community’, International Organization, 20: 750-773.
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 36
                                                                                                                                                        
Scheinman, L. and W. Feld (1972), ‘The European Economic Community and National Civil
Servants of The Member States’, International Organization, 26: 121-135.
Scully, R.M. (2002), ‘Going Native? Institutional and Partisan Loyalties in the European
Parliament’, in B. Steunenberg, J. Thomassen and J.J. Derrida (eds.) European Parliament:
Moving Towards Democracy in the EU, Lanham, Rowan and Littlefield.
Selznick, P. (1957), Leadership in Administration, New York: Harper & Son.
Shore, C. (2000), Building Europe. The Cultural Politics of European Integration, London:
Routledge.
Simon, H. (1957), Administrative Behavior, New York: Macmillan.
Smith, A. (2003), ‘Why European Commissioners Matter’, Journal of Common Market
Studies 41 (1): 137-155.
Smith, J. (2001), ‘Cultural Aspects of Europeanization: The Case of the Scottish Office’,
Public Administration, 79 (1): 147-165.
Smith, K.A. (1973), ‘The European Economic Community and National Civil Servants of the
Member States – A Comment’, International Organization, Vol. 27: 563-568.
Spence, D. (1997), ‘Structure, function and procedures in the Commission’, in G. Edwards
and D. Spence (eds.) The European Commission, London, Cartermill Publishing.
Spineli, A. (1966), The Eurocrats. Conflict and Crisis in the European Community,
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press.
Statskontoret (2001:17), Svenska nationalla experter i EU-tjänst, Stockholm.
CES – Working paper no. 8, 2003 37
                                                                                                                                                        
Stevens, A. and H. Stevens (2001), Brussels Bureaucrats? The Administration of the
European Union, Houndmills: Palgrave.
Stone Sweet, A. and W. Sandholtz (1998), ‘Integration, Supranational Governance, and the
Institutionalization of the European Policy’, in W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (eds.)
European Integration and Supranational Governance, New York: Oxford University Press.
Trondal, J. (1999b), ‘Integration through Participation – Introductory Notes to the Study of
Administrative Integration’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 3 (4),
http://www.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-004.htm
Trondal, J. (2001), Administrative Integration across Levels of Governance. Integration
through Participation in EU Committees. ARENA Report 7.
Trondal, J. (2002), ‘Why Europeanisation Happens. The Socializing Power of EU
Committees’, paper presented at the IDNET workshop “International Institutions and
Socialization in the New Europe”, EUI, Florence, February, 2002.
Trondal, J. (2003), ‘An Institutionalist Perspective on EU Committee Decision-Making’, in B.
Reinalda and B. Verbeek (eds.) Decision Making within International Organizations,
London: Routledge (forthcoming).
Trondal, J and F. Veggeland (2003), ‘Access, voice and loyalty. The representation of
domestic civil servants in EU Committees’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10 (1): 59-77.
Wessels, W. (1985), ‘Community Bureaucracy in a Changing Environment: Critisism,
Trends, Questions’, in J. Jamar and W. Wessels (eds.) Community Bureaucracy at the
Crossroads, Bruges, De Tempel.
